We revisit a classic coordination problem from the perspective of mechanism design: how can we coordinate a social welfare maximizing flow in a network congestion game with selfish players? The classical approach, which computes tolls as a function of known demands, fails when the demands are unknown to the mechanism designer, and naively eliciting them does not necessarily yield a truthful mechanism. Instead, we introduce a weak mediator that can provide suggested routes to players and set tolls as a function of reported demands. However, players can choose to ignore or misreport their type to this mediator. Using techniques from differential privacy, we show how to design a weak mediator such that it is an asymptotic ex-post Nash equilibrium for all players to truthfully report their types to the mediator and faithfully follow its suggestion, and that when they do, they end up playing a nearly optimal flow. Notably, our solution works in settings of incomplete information even in the absence of a prior distribution on player types. Along the way, we develop new techniques for privately solving convex programs which may be of independent interest.
INTRODUCTION
Large, atomic traffic routing games model the common scenario in which n agents (say, residents of a city) must choose paths in some graph (the road network) to route a unit of flow (drive to work) between their target source/sink pairs. In aggregate, the decisions of each of these agents cause congestion on the edges (traffic), and each agent experiences a cost equal to the sum of the latencies of the edges she traverses, given the decisions of everyone else. The latencies on each edge are a function of the congestion on that edge.
This widely studied class of games presents several well known challenges:
(1) First, for the social welfare objective, the price of anarchy is unboundedly large when the latencies can be arbitrary convex functions.
(2) Second, in atomic routing games, equilibria are not unique, and hence equilibrium selection is an important problem.
(3) Finally, as in most large games, players will be generally unaware of the types of their opponents, and so it is important to understand these games in settings of incomplete information.
One way to address the first challenge is to introduce carefully selected tolls on the edges, which modifies the game and decreases the price of anarchy. Indeed, so called marginal cost tolls make the socially optimal routing a Nash equilibrium. The marginal cost toll on each edge charges each agent the cost that she imposes on all other agents. However, in atomic congestion games with marginal cost tolls, the socially optimal routing is not necessarily the only Nash equilibrium routing, and so the price of anarchy can be larger than 1, and the coordination problem is still not solved. Moreover, because it is difficult to charge agents tolls as a function of what others are doing (as the marginal cost tolls do), there is a large literature that considers the problem of finding fixed tolls that induce the optimal routing, under various conditions [Cole et al. 2003; Fleischer 2005; Fleischer et al. 2004; Fotakis et al. 2010; Karakostas and Kolliopoulos 2004; Swamy 2007] This literature, however, assumes the agents' source/sink pairs are known, and computes the tolls as a function of this information. In this paper we instead take a mechanism design approach-the demands of the agents must be elicited, and agents may misrepresent their demands if it is advantageous to do so. Compared to standard mechanism design settings, our mechanism is somewhat restricted: it can only set anonymous tolls, and cannot require direct payments from the agents, and it also cannot force the agents to take any particular route. Because of these limitations, standard tools like the VCG mechanism do not apply. Instead, we approach the problem by introducing a weak mediator which also solves the 2nd and 3rd problems identified above-it solves the equilibrium selection problem, even in settings of incomplete information. The solutions we give are all approximate (both in terms of the incentives we guarantee, and our approximation to the optimal social welfare), but the solution approaches perfect as the game grows large.
Informally, a weak mediator is an intermediary with whom agents can choose to interact with. This leads to a new mediated game, related to the original routing game. In our setting, the weak mediator elicits the types of each agent. Based on the agents reports, it fixes constant tolls to charge on each edge, and then suggests a route for each agent to play. However, agents are free to act independently of the mediator. They need not report their type to it honestly, or even report a type at all. They are also not obligated to follow the route suggested by the mediator, and can deviate from it in arbitrary ways. Our goal is to design a mediator that incentivizes "good behavior" in the mediated game-that agents should truthfully report their type to the mediator, and then faithfully follow its suggestion. Moreover, we want that when agents do this, the resulting routing will be socially optimal.
Our main result is that this is possible in large routing games with convex loss functions. By large, we mean both that the number of players n is large, and that the latency functions are Lipschitz continuous-i.e. that no single agent can substantially affect the latency of any edge via a unilateral deviation. We give a weak mediator that makes "good behavior" an approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium-i.e. a Nash equilibrium in every game that might be induced by realizations of the agents types. This is an extremely robust solution concept that applies even when agents have no distributional knowledge of each other's types. In the limit as n goes to infinity, the approximate equilibrium becomes exact. The mediator also implements an approximately optimal routing, in that the welfare of the suggested routing is suboptimal by an addi-tive term that is sublinear in n. Hence, if the cost of the optimal routing grows linearly, or nearly linearly in n, then the approximately optimal flow achieves a fraction of the optimal social welfare that is arbitrarily close to 1.
Our Techniques and Main Results
At a high level, the approach we take is to design a mediator which takes as input the reported source/destination pairs of each agent, and as a function of those reports:
(1) Computes the optimal routing given the reported demands, and (2) Computes fixed tolls that make this routing a Nash equilibrium, and finally (3) Suggests to each player that they play their part of this optimal routing. However, implementing each of these steps straightforwardly does not make good behavior an equilibrium in general. Agents may hope to gain in two ways by misreporting their type: they may hope to change the tolls charged on the path that they eventually take, and they may hope to change the algorithm's suggestions to other players, to change the edge congestions. Simply because the game is large, and hence each player has little direct effect on the costs of other players does not necessarily mean that no player's report can have large effect on an algorithm which is computing an equilibrium (see e.g. for an example).
To address this problem, we follow the approach taken in Rogers and Roth 2014] and compute the optimal routing and tolls using joint differential privacy. Informally, joint differential privacy guarantees that if any agent unilaterally misreports her demand, then it has only a small effect on the routes taken by every other agent, as well as on the tolls. (It of course has a very large effect on the route suggested to that agent herself, since she is always given a route between her reported source/sink pairs!) As we show, this is sufficient to guarantee that an agent cannot benefit substantially by misreporting her demand. Assuming the other agents behave honestly-meaning they report their true demand and follow their suggested routethen the fact that the algorithm also is guaranteed to compute a routing which forms an approximate equilibrium of the game, given the tolls, guarantees that agents cannot do substantially better than also playing honestly, and playing their part of the computed equilibrium.
In order to do this, we need to develop new techniques for convex optimization under joint differential privacy. In particular, in order to find the socially optimal flow privately, we need the ability to privately solve a convex program with an objective that is not linearly separable among players, and hence one for which existing techniques [Hsu et al. 2014b ] do not apply.
We now informally state the main theorem of this paper. It asserts that there is a mediator that incentivizes good behavior as an ex-post Nash equilibrium, while implementing the optimal flow. Here we assume that the latency functions on the edges are bounded by the number of players n and are Lipschitz continuousalthough our formal theorem statement gives more general parameter tradeoffs. THEOREM 1.1 (INFORMAL). For large 1 routing games with n players and m edges, there exists a mediator M such that good behavior is an η eq -approximate Nash equilibrium in the mediated game where η eq =Õ m 3/2 n 4/5 and when players follow good behavior, the resulting flow is an η opt -approximately optimal average flow for the original routing game where η opt =Õ mn 4/5 .
To interpret this theorem, let us write OPT to denote the average player latency in the socially optimal flow. Note that in this parameter regime (latency functions which are bounded by n and Lipschitz), if the value OPT increases at a rate faster than n 4/5 as the population n grows, then our mediator yields a flow that obtains average latency (1 + o n (1)) · OPT. 2 We view this condition on OPT as very mild. For example, if the network is fixed and all of the latency functions have derivatives bounded strictly away from zero, then the optimal average latency will grow at a rate of Ω(n). Our results hold even when the optimal average latency grows sublinearly. Similarly, in this setting, for a 1 − o n (1) fraction of individuals the latency of their best response route also grows at a rate of Ω(n), and hence our mediator guarantees that for a (1 − o n (1))-fraction of individuals, they are playing an (1−o n (1))-approximate best-response (i.e. they cannot decrease their latency by more than a 1 − o n (1) multiplicative factor by deviating from the mediator's suggestion).
Related Work
There is a long history of using tolls to modify the equilibria in congestion games (see e.g. [Beckmann et al. 1956 ] for a classical treatment). More recently, there has been interest in the problem of computing fixed tolls to induce optimal flows at equilibrium in various settings, usually in non-atomic congestion games (see e.g. [Cole et al. 2003; Fleischer 2005; Fleischer et al. 2004; Fotakis et al. 2010; Karakostas and Kolliopoulos 2004; Swamy 2007 ] for a representative but not exhaustive sample). These papers study variations on the problem in which e.g. tolls represent lost welfare [Cole et al. 2003 ], or in which agents have heterogenous values for money [Fleischer et al. 2004] , or when agents are atomic but flow is splittable [Swamy 2007 ], among others. Tolls in atomic congestion games have received some attention as well (e.g. [Caragiannis et al. 2006] ), though to a lesser degree, since in general atomic congestion games, tolls do not suffice to implement the optimal flow as the unique equilibrium). These works all assume that agent demands are known, and do not have to be elicited from strategic agents, which is where the present paper departs from this literature. Recently, Bhaskar et al. [Bhaskar et al. 2014 ] consider the problem of computing tolls in a query model in which the latency functions are unknown (demands are known), but not in a setting in which agents are assumed to be behaving strategically to manipulate the tolls.
Modifying games by adding "mediators" is also well studied, although what exactly is meant by a mediator differs from paper to paper (see e.g. [Ashlagi et al. 2009; Tennenholtz 2003, 2009; Peleg and Procaccia 2010; Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz 2007] for a representative but not exhaustive sample). The "weak mediators" we study in this paper were introduced in Rogers and Roth 2014] , who also use differentially private equilibrium computation to achieve incentive properties. Our work differs from this prior work in that Rogers and Roth 2014] both seek to implement an equilibrium of the given game, and hence do not achieve welfare guarantees beyond the price of anarchy of the game. In contrast, we use tolls to modify the original game, and hence implement the socially optimal routing as an equilibrium.
The connection between differential privacy, defined by [Dwork et al. 2006 ], and mechanism design was first made by [McSherry and Talwar 2007] , who used it to give improved welfare guarantees for digital goods auctions. It has since been used in various contexts, including to design mechanisms for facility location games and general mechanism design problems without money [Nissim et al. 2012 ]. The connection between joint differential privacy and mechanism design (which is more subtle, and requires that the private algorithm also compute an equilibrium of some sort) was made by in the context of mediators, and has since been used in other settings including computing stable matchings [Kannan et al. 2015] , aggregative games [Cummings et al. 2014] , and combinatorial auctions [Hsu et al. 2014b ].
MODEL

The Routing Game Problem
In this section we introduce the atomic unsplittable routing game problem that we study. An instance of a routing game Γ = (G, , s) is defined by
We use m = |E| to denote the number of edges.
• A latency function e : R ≥0 → R ≥0 for each edge e ∈ E. Each latency function maps the number of players who send flow along that edge to a non-negative loss. • A set of n source-destination pairs s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ). Each pair s i = (s 1 i , s 2 i ) ∈ S ≡ V ×V represents the demand of player i. We use n to denote the number of players.
The objective is to (approximately) minimize the total latency experienced by all the players in the network. Let F(s) = (F(s 1 ), · · · , F(s n )) be the set of feasible individual flows for demand s and F = {F(s) : s ∈ S} be the set of all feasible individual flows. Notice that an element of F(s) is a vector of n separate flows, one for each player. That is, an individual flow is specified by n × m variables representing the amount of flow by each player routed on each edge. Specifically, given a graph G, F(s) is the set of unsplittable flows
For a given routing game instance Γ = (G, , s), we seek a flow x ∈ F(s) that minimizes the average latency φ(x)
We will sometimes write OPT(s) = φ(x * ), were x * is the minimum average cost flow for the routing game Γ = (G, , s) when the graph G and latencies are known from context. In this work we settle for an approximately minimum average cost flow, which we define below.
Definition 2.1 (Approximately Optimal Flow). For a routing game Γ, and parameter
We are interested in strategic players that want to minimize their individual cost
We thus define an approximate Nash flow.
Definition 2.2 (Approximate Nash Flow). For a routing game Γ and parameter η eq > 0, a flowx is an η eq -approximate Nash flow ifx ∈ F(s) and for every
Whenx is a 0-approximate Nash flow, we simply say that it is a Nash flow.
Throughout, we will make the following assumptions about the latency functions. ASSUMPTION 2.3. For every edge e ∈ E, the latency function e is (1) non-decreasing, (2) convex, (3) twice differentiable, (4) bounded by n (i.e. e (n) ≤ n), and (5) γ-lipschitz (i.e. | e (y) − e (y )| ≤ γ|y − y | for all e ∈ E) for some constant γ > 0.
Item 1 and 2 are natural and extremely common in the routing games literature. Item 3 is a technical condition used in our proofs that can likely be removed. Item 4 and 5 are the "largeness conditions" that ensure no player has large influence on any other's payoff. If the Lipschitz constant is zero, then we can choose an upper bound parameter γ > 0 in our analysis.
Mediators
Given an instance Γ = (G, , s), we would like the players to coordinate on the socialwelfare maximizing flow x * where OPT(s) = φ(x * ). There are two problems: the first is that the optimal flow is generally not a Nash equilibrium, and the second is that even with knowledge of everyone's demands, Nash equilibria are not unique and coordination is a problem. The classical solution to the first problem is to have an overseer impose edge tolls τ , which are a function of the demands s of each player. This makes x * a Nash flow for the routing game instance Γ τ = (G, τ , s) where τ e (y) = e (y) + τ e . However the tolls that cause the optimal flow to be an equilibrium depend on the demands, and so this approach fails if the overseer does not know s. A simple solution would be to elicit the demands from the players, but since the correct tolls depend on the demands, naively eliciting them may not lead to a truthful mechanism.
We solve this problem, as well as the equilibrium selection problem mentioned above, by introducing a mediator that takes as input the demand of each player and outputs a set of tolls for each edge, together with a suggested route for each player to use. Ideally, the players will report their demands truthfully, the aggregate of the routes suggested by the mediator will be a social-welfare maximizing flow x * , agents will faithfully follow their suggestion, and the tolls will be chosen to make x * an (approximate) Nash flow. However, players have the option to deviate from this desired behavior in several ways: they may not report their demand to the mediator at all, might report a false demand, or might not follow the mediator's suggestion once it is given. Our goal in designing the mediator is to guarantee that players never have significant incentive to deviate from the desired behavior described above.
Formally, introducing the mediator gives rise to a modified game Γ M = (G, , s, M ). The mediator is an algorithm M : {⊥ ∪ S} n → F n × R m . The input from each player is either a demand or a ⊥ symbol indicating that the player opts out. The output is a set of routes, one suggested to each player, together with a collection of tolls, one for each edge. We write the output as
s)) e∈E that M outputs will enforce the optimal flow induced by the reported demands. Note that the tolls that M outputs to each player are the same (i.e. the players are not charged personalized tolls; rather there is a single toll on each edge that must be paid by any player using that edge).
In Γ M each player can opt-out of using the mediator, denoted by the report ⊥, and then select some way to route from his source to his destination, or a player can optin to using the mediator, but not necessarily reveal her true demand, and then the mediator will suggest a path x i to route her unit flow from the reported source to the destination. Players are free to follow the suggested action, but they can also use the suggestion as part of an arbitrary deviation, i.e. they can play any action f (x i ) for any f : F → F. Thus, the action set A for any player for the game instance Γ M is
We next define the cost function for each player in Γ M , but first we must present some notation. Let F be the set of possible functions
) as the new congestion on edge e when players have deviated from x according to functions f i for i ∈ [n]. We will consider only randomized algorithms, so our cost is an expectation over outcomes of M . More formally, the cost φ M that each player experiences in Γ M is defined as
We are interested in designing mediators such that good behavior in the mediated game is an ex-post Nash equilibrium, which we define below.
forms an η-approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium if for every profile of demands s ∈ S n , and for every player i and action a i ∈ A:
That is, it forms an η-approximate Nash equilibrium for every realization of demands.
Our goal is to incentivize players to follow good behavior-truthfully reporting their demand, and then faithfully following the suggested action of the mediator. Formally, the good behavior strategy for player i is ξ i (s i ) = (s i , id) where s i is i's actual demand, and id : F → F is the identity map. We write ξ i = ξ i (s i ) for the good behavior strategy.
To accomplish this goal, we will design a mediator that is "insensitive" to the reported demand of each player. Informally, if a player's reported demand does not substantially effect the tolls chosen by the mediator, or the paths suggested to other players, then a player has little incentive to lie about his demand (of course any mediator with this property must necessarily allow the path suggested to agent i to depend strongly on agent i's own reported demand!). We capture this notion of insensitivity using joint differential privacy , which is defined as follows.
Definition 2.5. (Joint Differential Privacy ]) A randomized algorithm M : S n → O n , where O is an arbitrary output set for each player, satisfies (ε, δ)joint differential privacy if for every player i, every pair s i , s i ∈ S, any tuple s −i ∈ S n−1 and any
Joint differential privacy (JDP) is a relaxation of the notion of differential privacy (DP) [Dwork et al. 2006 ]. We state the definition of DP below, both for comparison, and because it will be important technically in designing our mediator.
Definition 2.6. (Differential Privacy [Dwork et al. 2006 ]) A randomized algorithm M : S n → O satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any player i, any two s i , s i ∈ S, any tuple s −i ∈ S n−1 , and any
Note that JDP is weaker than DP, because JDP assumes that the output space of the algorithm is partitioned among the n players, and the output to player i can depend arbitrarily on the input of player i, and only the output to players j = i must be insensitive to the input of player i. This distinction is crucial in mechanism design settings-the output to player i is a suggested route for player i to follow, and thus should satisfy player i's reported demand, which is highly sensitive to the input of player i. Also note that since our mediator will output the same tolls to every player, the tolls computed by the mediator must satisfy standard DP.
A key property we use is that a JDP mediator that also computes an equilibrium of the underlying game gives rise to an approximately truthful mechanism. This result was first shown in Rogers and Roth 2014] , although for simpler models that do not include tolls. We now state and prove a simple extension of this result that is appropriate for our setting. THEOREM 2.7. Given routing game Γ = (G, , s) and upper bound U on the tolls, let M :
(2) For any input demand profile s, we have with probability 1 − β that
is an η eq -approximate Nash flow in the modified routing game Γ τ = (G, M , s) where PROOF. We fix s ∈ S n to be the true source destination of the players. We consider a unilateral deviation ξ i (s i ) = (s i , f i ) for player i to report s i and use f i , which we write as ξ i . We write the modified cost function for player i in Γ τ with tolls τ e = M τ e (s) to be
We define the best response flow that player i of demand s i can route given the flows of the other players to be BR τ i (x −i ) = argmin xi∈F (si) {φ τ i (x i , x −i )} . We first condition on the event that M gives an η eq -approximate Nash flow in Γ τ .
We then use the fact that M is JDP. We write s = (s i , s −i ).
The first inequality comes from using the fact that M is (ε, δ)-JDP and the fact that φ τ i (x) ≤ m(U + n). The second inequality uses the fact that e ε ≤ 1 + 2ε for ε < 1. The last inequality follows from the fact that player i can only do worse by not best responding to the other players' flows. Lastly, we know that M does not produce an η eqapproximate Nash flow in Γ τ with probability less than β, which gives the additional β term in the theorem statement.
The rest of the paper will be dedicated to constructing such a mediator that satisfies the hypotheses in Theorem 2.7. We now state the main result of our paper. THEOREM 2.8. For routing games Γ that satisfy Assumption 2.3 and parameter β > 0, there exists a mediator M : {⊥ ∪ S} n → F n × [0, nγ] m such that with probability 1 − β good behavior forms an η-approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium in Γ M where η =Õ m 3/2 n 4/5 and the resulting flow from the good behavior strategy is η opt -approximately optimal for η opt =Õ mn 4/5 .
FLOW MEDIATOR WITH TOLLS
We start by presenting a high level overview of the design of our algorithm. Our goal is to design a mediator that takes as input the demands, or source-destination pairs, s of the players and outputs a nearly optimal flow x • for Γ = (G, , s) together with edge tolls τ , such that the tolls are not heavily influenced by any single player's report and no one's report has major influence on the flow induced by the other players. Further, we need the tolls τ to be carefully computed so that x • is also an approximate Nash flow in the instance Γ τ = (G, τ , s). We construct such a mediator in the following way:
(1) We compute an approximately optimal flow x • subject to JDP, using a privacy preserving variant of projected gradient descent. This ends up being the most technical part of the paper and so we leave the details to Section 4 and give the formal algorithm P-GD in the full version. 3 For the rest of this section we assume we have x • . (2) Given x • , we need to compute the necessary tollsτ such that players are approximately best responding in Γτ = (G, τ , s) when playing x • . We computeτ as a function of a noisy version of the edge congestionŷ induced by the flow x • so that τ is DP. We give the procedure P-CON that computesŷ in Algorithm 2. We must be cautious at this step because x • is only approximately optimal (and the tolls are computed with respect to a perturbed version of the induced congestion), so there may be a few players that are not playing approximate best responses in Γτ . We call these players unsatisfied.
(3) We show that the number of unsatisfied players in Γτ with flow x • is small, so we can modify x • by having the unsatisfied players play best responses to the induced flow. Because the number of unsatisfied players was small, we can show that this modification does not substantially reduce the payoff of the other players. Therefore, if those players were playing approximate best responses before the modification, they will continue to do so after. The procedure P-BR, given in Algorithm 3, ensures every player is approximately best responding. The result is a slightly modified flowx which is nearly optimal in Γ and an approximate Nash flow in Γτ . (4) The final output is thenx andτ .
Our mediator FlowToll is formally given in Algorithm 1 and is composed of the subroutines described above. In FlowToll we are using P-GD as a black box that computes an α-approximate optimal flow, which we show in the full version that we can set
The rest of this paper is dedicated to analyzing the subroutines of FlowToll.
ALGORITHM 1: Flow Mediator with Tolls
FlowToll(Γ, ε, δ, β); Input: A routing game instance Γ = (G, , s); privacy parameter (ε, δ); failure probability β Output:xi, a (s 1 i , s 2 i )-flow for each player i ∈ [n], and a tollτe for each edge e ∈ E (1) Compute an α-approximately optimal flow
(2) Compute congestionŷ ← P-CON(x • , ε/4) and tollsτ ← τ * (ŷe) where τ * (·) is given in (6).
(3) Improve some players' pathŝ
returnx andτ Remark 3.1. Throughout our discussion of the subroutines, we will sometimes say "player i plays..." or "player i best responds to..." to describe player i's action in some flow computed by these subroutines. While these descriptions are natural, they could be slightly misleading. We want to clarify that our mediator mechanism is not interactive or online, and all the computation is done by the algorithm. The players will simply submit their private source-destination pairs and will only receive a suggested feasible path along with the tolls over the edges.
Private Tolls Mechanism
We show in this section that given an approximately optimal flow x • we can compute the necessary tollsτ in a DP way. Ultimately, we want to compute constant tolls, but a useful intermediate step is to consider the following functional tolls, which are edge tolls that can depend on the congestion on that edge. Specifically, we define the marginal-cost toll τ * e : R → R for each edge e ∈ E to be τ * e (y) = (y − 1)( e (y) − e (y − 1)),
which gives rise to a different routing game Γ τ * = (G, τ * , s) with latency function defined as τ * e (y) = e (y) + τ * e (y) for e ∈ E. We first show that a marginal-cost toll enforces the optimal flow in an atomic, unsplittable routing game, and then show how to use this fact to privately compute constant tolls that approximately enforce the optimal flow at equilibrium. Recall the classical potential function method [Monderer and Shapley 1996] for congestion games that defines a potential function Ψ : R n×m → R such that a flow x that minimizes Ψ is also a (exact) Nash flow in Γ τ * = (G, τ * , s), where
[ e (i) + τ * e (i)] , and y e = i∈[n]
x i,e .
LEMMA 3.2. Let x * be the (exact) optimal flow in routing game Γ = (G, , s), then x * is a Nash flow in Γ τ * = (G, τ * , s) PROOF. First, we show that n · φ(x) = Ψ(x) where φ is given in (3):
[y e e (y e ) − 0 e (0)] = e y e e (y e ) = n · φ(x).
Note that x * minimizes the potential function Ψ. We know from [Monderer and Shapley 1996] that the flow that minimizes the potential function Ψ is a Nash flow of the routing game Γ τ * . Hence x * is a Nash flow.
Since we only have access to an approximately optimal flow x • , we will compute the marginal-cost tolls based on x • instead. In order to release DP tolls, we compute them using a private versionŷ e of the total edge congestion y e = i x • i,e that is output by P-CON (presented in Algorithm 2). Using a standard technique in differential privacy, we can release a private version of the edge congestion by perturbing the congestion on each edge with noise from an appropriately scaled Laplace distribution. Since the analysis is standard, we defer the details to the full version. Lastly, to get the constant tolls for the mediator FlowToll, we will evaluate the marginal-cost toll function on the perturbed edge congestionŷ: setτ e = τ * e (ŷ e ) for e ∈ E. To show that the constant tollsτ are private, we need to first show that the noisy congestionŷ output by P-CON is DP in the demands s. We will show later that P-GD which computes x • is JDP in s. We then use x • as input to P-CON, which we know is DP with respect to any flow input x. To bridge the two privacy guarantees, we rely on the following composition lemma (with proof in the full version) to show thatŷ is DP in s.
Now we are ready to establish the privacy guarantee of bothŷ andτ . COROLLARY 3.4. Given the approximately optimal flow x • computed from P-GD(Γ, ε/4, δ/2, β/2), the perturbed congestionŷ output by P-CON(x • , ε/4) and the constant tollsτ = (τ * e (ŷ e )) e∈E are (3ε/4, δ/2)-differentially private in the demands s. PROOF. Note that x • is output by P-GD(Γ, ε/4, δ/2, β/2), so it is (ε/4, δ/2)-JDP in s. Using analysis of the Laplace mechanism, we know that P-CON(x • , ε/4) is (ε/4)-DP in x • . Therefore, the noisy congestionŷ output by the composition of these two functions is (3ε/4, δ/2)-DP by Lemma 3.3. Sinceτ is simply a post-processing of the noisy congestionŷ, we know thatτ is (3ε/4, δ/2)-DP.
Simultaneous Best Responses of Unsatisfied Players
At this point of the mechanism, we have computed the approximately optimal flow x • and constant tollsτ that define the tolled routing game Γτ . In this section, we show how to modify x • to obtain a new approximately optimal flowx that is also an approximate Nash equilibrium in the presence of the same constant tollsτ .
Recall from Lemma 3.2 that there is an exactly optimal flow x * and functional tolls τ * such that x * is an exact Nash flow of the routing game under tolls τ * . Our flow-toll pair (x • ,τ ) differs from (x * , τ * ) in three ways.
(1) The flow x • is only approximately optimal.
(2) The tollsτ we impose on the edges are constants while the functional tolls τ * may be functions of the congestion.
(3) Tollsτ are derived from noisy congestionŷ, not the exact congestion y • = i x • i . As a result, there may be some unsatisfied players who could significantly benefit from deviating from x • . We obtain the new approximate Nash flowx by rerouting the unsatisfied players in x • along their best response route in the flow x • with constant edge tollsτ . To analyze the new flowx, we show that there are not too many unsatisfied players. Thus, even if we modify the routes of all of the unsatisfied players, the overall congestion does not change too much, and thus the players who were previously satisfied remain satisfied.
To determine if a player is unsatisfied and what their best response is, we need to know the costs they face for different paths, which depends on the flow y • = i x • i . However, to ensure privacy, we only have access to a perturbed flowŷ. Thus, we will define unsatisfied players relative to this noisy flowŷ computed by P-CON. More generally we can define the best response function of a player relative to any flow y.
Given any congestion y (not necessarily even a sum of feasible individual flows) and routing game Γ = (G, , s), we define c xi (y) to be player i's cost for routing on path x i under the congestion of y, that is c xi (y) = e∈E x i,e · e (y e ).
Note that n i=1 c xi (y) = nφ(x) and c xi (y) = φ i (x) when y e = n i=1 x i,e for e ∈ E. We then define the condition for being unsatisfied with respect to congestion y as follows.
Definition 3.5. Given congestion y and routing game Γ = (G, , s), we say that a player i with s i -flow x i is ρ-unsatisfied with respect to y if he could decrease his cost by at least ρ via a unilateral deviation. That is, there exists a path x i ∈ F(s i ) such that c x i (y ) ≤ c xi (y) − ρ where y = y − x i + x i is the flow that would result from player i making this deviation. If player i is not ρ-unsatisfied, then we say i is ρ-satisfied. We will sometimes omit y if it is clear from context. The next lemma bounds the number of unsatisfied players in x • in the routing game Γτ = (G, +τ , s) with respect to the noisy congestionŷ.
LEMMA 3.6. Let x • be an α-approximately optimal flow,ŷ = P-CON(x • , ε) be the noisy aggregate flow, andτ = τ * (ŷ) be a vector of constant tolls. Then with probability at least 1 − β for β > 0, there are at most nα/4mγ players who areζ ε -unsatisfied players in Γτ with respect to the congestionŷ, for
We will now give a rough sketch of the proof, formally given in the full version PROOF SKETCH. First, we will consider the routing game Γ τ * under the (functional) marginal-cost toll. We will also assume for now that we have the exact congestion y • = i x • i . Recall from Lemma 3.2 that the potential function Ψ for this game is equal to the total congestion cost n · φ. Since x • is an α-approximate optimal flow, it also approximately minimizes Ψ up to error n · α. The construction of Ψ is such that if a player who is ρ-unsatisfied with respect to y • plays her best response, then Ψ decreases by at least ρ. Therefore the number of ρ-unsatisfied players with respect to y • is at most nα/ρ. Here we are intentionally being slightly imprecise to ease exposition. See the full proof for details. Now, consider the routing game Γ τ = (G, + τ, s) that arises from using the constant tolls τ = τ * (y • ). Note that under functional tolls τ * , when a player best responds, the tolls may change, however under constant tolls τ the tolls do not change. This might increase the number of players who can gain by deviating. However, notice that when one player changes their route, the tools τ * e and τ e can only change by γ, since τ * e is γ-Lipschitz. Thus changing from tolls τ * to τ can only change the cost any player faces on any route by mγ. Therefore, we can argue that the number of (ρ + 2mγ)-unsatisfied players with respect to y • in the game Γ τ is also at most nα/ρ.
The last issue to address is that we compute the tolls from the noisy congestionŷ instead of the exact congestion y • . This has two effects: 1) the constant tollsτ = τ * (ŷ) are different from the constant tolls τ = τ * (y • ) analyzed above and 2) we want to measure the number of unsatisfied players with respect toŷ instead of y • . We can address both of these issues using the fact that the noise is small on every edge. Therefore |y e −ŷ e | is small, and since τ * e is Lipschitz, |τ e −τ e | is small as well. In the full proof we carefully account for the magnitude of the noise and its effect on the cost faced by each player to obtain the guarantees stated in the lemma.
We have so far shown that there might be a few players that are unsatisfied with their current route in Γτ = (G, +τ , s) when they only know a perturbed version of the congestionŷ. We then let these unsatisfied players simultaneously change routes to the routes with the lowest cost (according to the cost c xi (y)). This procedure, P-BR, is detailed in Algorithm 3. Where y e = ye − 1 if xi,e = 1, x i,e = 0; y e = ye + 1 if xi,e = 0, x i,e = 1; else ye = y e . returnx
We are now ready to show that the final flow assignmentsx resulting from the procedure P-BR(Γτ , x • ,ζ ε ), where x • is an α-approximate optimal flow in Γ andζ ε is given in (9), forms an approximate Nash equilibrium in the game Γτ and remains an approximately optimal flow for the original routing game instance Γ.
LEMMA 3.7. Fix any α > 0 and β, ε ∈ (0, 1). Let Γ = (G, , s) be a routing game and x • be an α-approximately optimal flow in Γ. Letx = P-BR(Γτ ,ŷ, x • ,ζ ε ) forζ ε given in (9),ŷ = P-CON(x • , ε), andτ = τ * (ŷ). Then with probability at least 1 − β,x is an η eq (α)-Nash flow in Γτ = (G, +τ , s) where
andx is an η opt (α)-approximate Nash flow in Γ where
PROOF. First, to show thatx forms an approximate Nash flow, we need to argue that all players are approximately satisfied with respect to the actual congestion y = ix i . As an intermediate step, we will first show that all players inx are approximately satisfied with the input perturbed congestionŷ.
By Lemma 3.6, we know that the number ofζ ε -unsatisfied players that deviate in our instantiation of P-BR is bounded by √ nα/(2 √ mγ) ≡ K. After these players' joint deviation, the congestion on any path is changed by at most m K, so the total cost on any path is changed by at most mγK = √ mnαγ/2. Therefore, the players that deviate are √ mnαγ-satisfied in Γτ with respect to congestionŷ after the simultaneous moves.
Similarly, the players that were originallyζ ε -satisfied in Γτ with congestionŷ remain (ζ ε + √ mnαγ)-satisfied withŷ even after the joint deviations. From standard bounds on the tails of Laplace distribution, we can bound the difference betweenŷ and i x • i : with probability at least 1 − β,
Since the number of players that deviate in P-BR is bounded by K, we could bound y − i x • i ∞ ≤ K. By triangle inequality, we get ŷ − y ∞ ≤ 2m log(m/β)/ε + K.
Since all players inx are (ζ ε + √ mnαγ)-satisfied with congestionŷ, we show in the full version that they are also η eq -satisfied with the actual congestion y, where
Hence, the flowx forms an η eq -approximate Nash flow in game Γτ . To bound the cost ofx, note that for each edge e, the number of players can increase by at most K. Let y • = i x • i , then for each edge, y e e (y e ) − y • e e (y • e ) ≤ nγK + nγ = nK(γ + 1). Therefore, the average cost forx is
This completes the proof.
Analysis of FlowToll
Now that we have analyzed the subroutines P-CON and P-BR along with computing the private tollsτ , we are ready to analyze the complete mediator FlowToll. Note that in this analysis we will assume that the subroutine P-GD is a blackbox that is JDP and computes an approximately optimal flow in Γ.
We first prove that the mediator FlowToll is JDP. This will give the first condition we require of our mediator in Theorem 2.7. A useful tool in proving mechanisms are JDP is the billboard lemma, which states at a high level that if amechanism can be viewed as posting some public signal (i.e. as if on "a billboard") that is DP in the players' demands, from which (together with knowledge of their own demand) players can derive their part of the output of the mechanism, then the resulting mechanism is JDP. 
M is then (ε, δ)-jointly differentially private.
We show that FlowToll is jointly differentially private via the billboard lemma. THEOREM 3.9. For ε, δ, β > 0, the procedure FlowToll(Γ, ε, δ, β) in Algorithm 1 is (ε, δ)-joint differentially private in the player's input demands s.
PROOF. In order to show JDP using the Billboard Lemma, we need to show that for each player i, the output flowx i and toll vectorτ can be computed only based on i's demands s i and some (ε, δ)-DP signal.
In the full version, we show that the subroutine P-GD(Γ, ε/4, δ/2, β/2) operates in the Billboard model, and can be computed from some (ε/4, δ/2)-DP billboard signal Λ.
Note that the output flowx i for each player i produced by P-BR(Γτ ,ŷ, x • ,ζ ε/4 ) is just a function of the perturbed congestionŷ, x • i and player i's demand. Recall that we know thatŷ = P-CON(x • , ε/4) is (3ε/4, δ/2)-DP in s by Corollary 3.4. Therefore, the output flowx i for each i is just a function of the (ε, δ)-DP signal (Λ,ŷ), and i's demand s i . Also, the tollsτ are computed as a function only ofŷ. Therefore, by the Billboard Lemma 3.8, the mediator FlowToll(Γ, ε, δ, β) satisfies (ε, δ)-JDP. Now we give the appropriate choices of the parameters (ε, δ, β) for FlowToll(Γ, ε, δ, β) that leads to our main result in Theorem 2.8 PROOF OF THEOREM 2.8. Given any routing game instance Γ = (G, , s), we first show that FlowToll is a mediator that makes good behavior an η-approximate Nash equilibrium of the mediated game Γ FlowToll for η =Õ m 3/2 n 4/5 .
We assume that P-GD(Γ, ε/2, δ/2, β/2) produces an α-approximate optimal flow x • with probability 1 − β/2 (leaving the formal proofs to the full version) where α is given in (5). Consider the instantiation of FlowToll(Γ, ε, δ, β) with ε = √ m n 1/5 , δ = n −2 , β = n −2 . Given the functional tolls τ * defined in (6) and the fact that if we ever get an edge congestionŷ e > n from the output of P-CON then we round it down to n, so the edge tollŝ τ e are never bigger than nγ. Using our bound for η eq (α) in (10) and setting η eq = η eq (α) where α is given in (5), from Theorem 2.7 we have with probability 1 − β the bound η ≤ η eq + m(U + n)(2ε + β + δ) =Õ m 3/2 n 4/5 .
We then show that good behavior results in an η opt -approximately optimal flow for the original routing game instance Γ, where η opt =Õ mn 4/5 . It then follows that η opt = η opt (α) from (11) and for α given in (5).
COMPUTING AN APPROXIMATELY OPTIMAL FLOW UNDER JDP
In this section we show how to compute an approximately optimal flow x • under joint differential privacy. We first consider a convex relaxation of the problem of minimizing social cost in the routing game instance (Γ, , s). Let F R (s) ⊆ [0, 1] n×m be the set of feasible fractional flows (i.e. the convex relaxation of the set F(s)). Then the optimal fractional flow is given by the convex program: min c(y) = 1 n e∈E y e e (y e )
such that
x i,e ∀e ∈ E, ∀i ∈ [n]
Note that the second derivative of y e e (y) is 2 e (y e ) + y e e (y e ). Since e is assumed to be convex and nondecreasing, the second derivative is non-negative as long as y e ≥ 0.
Hence the objective function c of this program is indeed convex on the feasible region. We write G R (s) := F R (s) × [0, n] m to denote the space where the decision variables reside, i.e. (x, y) ∈ G R (s). Given any demands s, we write OPT R (s) to denote the optimal objective value of the convex program and OPT(s) to be the optimal objective value when x ∈ F(s). Note that we always have OPT R (s) ≤ OPT(s)
Our goal is to first compute an approximately optimal solution to the relaxed convex program, and then round the resulting fractional solution to be integral. We then show that the final solution is an approximately optimal flow to the original instance Γ.
The JDP Gradient Descent Algorithm
We will work extensively with the Lagrangian of our problem. For each constraint of (13), we introduce a dual variable λ e . The Lagrangian is then L(x, y, λ) = c(y) − e∈E λ e ( i x i,e − y e ) . Since our convex program satisfies Slater's condition [Slater 1959 ], we know that strong duality holds: 
We will interpret the Lagrangian objective as the payoff function of a zero-sum game between the minimization player, who plays flows z = (x, y), and the maximization player, who plays dual variables λ. We will abuse notation and write L(z, λ) = L(x, y, λ). We refer to the game defined by this payoff matrix the Lagrangian game. We will privately compute an approximate equilibrium of the Lagrangian game by simulating repeated plays between the two players. In each step, the dual player will play an approximate best response to the flow player's strategy. The flow player will update his flow using a no-regret algorithm.
In particular, the flow player uses an online gradient descent algorithm to produce a sequence of T actions {z (1) , . . . , z (T ) } based on the loss functions given by the dual player's actions {λ (1) , . . . , λ (T ) }. At each round t = 1, . . . , T , the flow player will update both x (t) and y (t) using the projected gradient update step GD in Algorithm 4.
In order to reason about how quickly the projected gradient procedure converges to an approximately optimal flow, we need to bound the diameter of the space of dual solutions. We will also need to argue that bounding the space of feasible dual solutions does not affect the value of the game. Specifically, we will bound the dual players' action to the set B = {λ ∈ R m | λ 1 ≤ 2m}, Then fixing a flow played by the primal player, the dual player's best response is simply to select an edge e where the constraint (13)
